Multi-agent consensus under jamming attacks is investigated. Specifically, inter-agent communications over a network are assumed to fail at certain times due to jamming of transmissions by a malicious attacker. A new stochastic communication protocol is proposed to achieve finite-time practical consensus between agents. In this protocol, communication attempt times of agents are randomized and unknown by the attacker until after the agents make their communication attempts. Through a probabilistic analysis, we show that the proposed communication protocol, when combined with a stochastic ternary control law, allows agents to achieve consensus regardless of the frequency of attacks. We demonstrate the efficacy of our results by considering two different strategies of the jamming attacker: a deterministic attack strategy and a more malicious communication-aware attack strategy.
Introduction
Nowadays, control systems heavily utilize information and communication technologies. Especially, the Internet of Things is becoming widespread and remote sensing/control operations can now take place over wireless networks. With these new developments, the risk of cyber attacks against control systems is also increasing. Communication channels used in control systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks and ensuring cyber security of control systems has become a very important challenge (Sandberg et al., 2015) .
Networked control systems are threatened by different types of cyber attacks. For instance, on a vulnerable network, measurement and control data can be altered by a malicious attacker (Fawzi et al., 2014) . In certain situations, attackers can even inject false data into the system without being noticed (Mo et al., 2010) . These attacks require the attacker to be knowledgeable about the system dynamics. In the context of multi-agent systems, the presence of faulty or even malicious agents not following the given protocols may affect the global behavior of the overall system. There is a rich history in computer science on the development of resilient consensus algorithms (e.g., Lynch (1996) , Azadmanesh and Kieckhafer (2002) ). Recently, this problem has gained interest in systems and control as well (LeBlanc et al., 2013; Tseng and Vaidya, 2015; Dibaji et al., 2016; Dibaji and Ishii, 2017) .
On the other hand, attackers who have limited information about the control system can resort to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks to prevent communication over networks. For instance, malicious routers in a network may intentionally drop measurement and control data (Awerbuch et al., 2008; Mahmoud and Shen, 2014) . Moreover, denial-of-service on wireless networks can also happen in the form of jamming attacks. A jamming attacker can block the transmissions on a wireless channel by emitting strong interference signals (Xu et al., 2005; Pelechrinis et al., 2011) . Recently, researchers explored the effect of jamming and other types of denial-ofservice attacks on networked control systems (De Persis and Tesi, 2016; Shisheh-Foroush and Martínez, 2016; Cetinkaya et al., 2017a; Cetinkaya et al., 2017b; Feng and Tesi, 2017) . Moreover, the effect of jamming on multi-agent consensus has also been explored (Senejohnny et al., 2015; Senejohnny et al., 2017) .
One of the main challenges in studying the multi-agent con-sensus problem under jamming attacks is that the attacker's actions cannot be known a priori. To account for the uncertainty in the generation of attacks, the works (Senejohnny et al., 2015; Senejohnny et al., 2017) characterized jamming attacks through their average duration and frequency. It is shown there that multi-agent consensus can be achieved if the duration and the frequency of attacks satisfy certain conditions. Specifically, these works consider a self-triggered control framework, where each agent attempts to communicate with its neighbors and update its local control input only when a triggering condition is satisfied. For consensus, it is required that the ratio of the duration of the attacks to the total time is less than one. This ensures that the jamming does not span the entire time. Note that under the selftriggering framework, the communication attempt times for the agents are deterministic. Thus, an attacker who is knowledgeable on the multi-agent system can determine those time instants. This allows the attacker to block the communication by turning on the jamming attack very briefly at those instants without violating the duration condition. To avoid this issue, a restriction on the attack frequency becomes necessary. Specifically, the frequency of the attacks is required to be less than the frequency of the communication attempts by the agents.
Motivated by the discussion above, our goal in this paper is to develop a new consensus framework to deal with attack scenarios where the jamming is turned on and off very frequently. In particular, we use the ternary control laws previously used in (De Persis and Frasca, 2013; Senejohnny et al., 2015; Senejohnny et al., 2017) . However, instead of the self-triggering method utilized in those works, we propose a stochastic communication protocol that can achieve consensus regardless of the frequency of the attacks. In this protocol, each agent attempts to communicate with its neighbors at random time instants. These time instants are hence unknown by the attacker.
We consider two attack strategies that are restricted by their average duration but not by their frequency. In the first strategy, the starting time and the duration of the jamming attacks are deterministic and do not depend on the time instants at which the agents try to communicate. On the other hand, in the second strategy the attacker is aware of the communication attempts of the agents and can preserve energy by turning off jamming right after a communication attempt is blocked. We show that in both strategies, our proposed stochastic communication protocol guarantees infinitely many successful communications in the long run. Furthermore, by using a probabilistic analysis, we show that almost-sure finite-time practical consensus is achieved regardless of attack frequency as long as the average ratio of attack durations is less than hundred-percent.
Our approach for analyzing the consensus under jamming differs largely from those in the literature. In particular, for the deterministic communication strategy proposed in (Senejohnny et al., 2015; Senejohnny et al., 2017) , bounds on attack frequency can be used for establishing an upperbound for the interval between two consecutive successful communication times of an agent. Here in this paper, such an upper-bound is not available and there is a positive probability that any finite number of consecutive communication attempts can be blocked by a jamming attacker. This difference is due to the fact that we do not consider a bound for attack frequencies and our communication protocol involves randomization of transmission times. We also note that although there are several works that deal with random connectivity issues and randomly switching graph topologies in multi-agent systems (e.g., Tahbaz-Salehi and Jadbabaie (2010), Zhang and Tian (2010) , You et al. (2013) ), the analysis techniques in this paper are completely different from those works due to our approach of intentionally randomizing the inter-agent communication times to mitigate jamming attacks which occur at uncertain times.
Our analysis for consensus relies on first establishing that under randomized transmissions, all agents can communicate with their neighbors infinitely many times in the long run. This is shown for the deterministic and the communicationaware attacks using different techniques. In the case of deterministic attacks, the independence of attacks and communication attempts plays an important role. Another big role is played by the uniform distribution of random communication attempt times. On the other hand, in the case of communication-aware attacks, the timing of attacks depends on all previous history of the communication times of agents. In the analysis of this case, we construct a filtration that represents the progression of the actions of the agents and those of the attacker. By utilizing this filtration, we show that our protocol can achieve a positive probability of at least one successful inter-agent transmission during carefully selected sufficiently long intervals spanning the time domain. We then utilize the monotone-convergence theorem for sets to show that even in communication-aware attacks, each agent can make infinitely many successful communications in the long run. This result allows us to show that with suitable choice of control parameters, each agent would be able to select appropriate control actions and apply them long enough to reach consensus in finite time.
In this paper, we show that randomization in inter-agent communications enables agents to reach consensus regardless of the frequency of jamming attacks. In recent works, randomization in communication has been exploited in different ways. For instance, randomized gossip algorithms is used in Boyd et al. (2006) to allow networked operation under limited computation and communication resources. Furthermore, the work by Dibaji et al. (2016) introduced randomness in quantization as well as in communication times to increase resiliency against malicious nodes in multi-agent systems. Such advantages of using probabilistic methods have been found in resilient consensus in computer science and are often referred to as "impossibility results" (e.g., Lynch (1996) ). In addition, random frequency hopping techniques are utilized by Navda et al. (2007) and Pöpper et al. (2010) to mitigate jamming in wireless networks.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain the multi-agent consensus problem under jamming attacks. We propose a stochastic communication protocol and provide conditions for consensus under jamming attacks in Section 3. Then we discuss our protocol's efficacy under deterministic and communication-aware attacks in Section 4. In Section 5, we present numerical examples to demonstrate our results. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
We note that part of the results in Sections 3 and 4 appeared in our preliminary report (Kikuchi et al., 2017) without proofs. In this paper, we provide complete proofs and more detailed discussions in Sections 3 and 4. Furthermore, new numerical examples are presented in Section 5.
The notation used in the paper is fairly standard. Specifically, we denote positive and nonnegative integers by N and N 0 , respectively. Furthermore, we use (·)
T to denote transpose, |S| to denote the Lebesgue measure of a set S ⊂ R, and A \ B to denote the set of elements that belong to set A, but not to set B. The notations P[·] and E[·] respectively denote the probability and the expectation on a probability space (Ω, F , P). Moreover, we use 1 [E] : Ω → {0, 1} for the indicator of the event E ∈ F , that is,
To simplify the presentation, we omit the ω ∈ Ω in the notation of random variables in certain equations.
Multi-Agent Consensus Under Jamming Attacks
In this paper, we investigate the consensus problem for a multi-agent system composed of n agents with scalar dynamics. The communication topology of the multi-agent system is represented by an undirected connected graph G = (V, E), where V = {1, . . . , n} represents the set of nodes corresponding to the n agents, and E ⊂ V × V is the set of edges corresponding to the communication links between the agents. Let N i be the set of neighbors and d i be the degree of node i. We use L ∈ R n×n to denote the Laplacian matrix associated with G. Note that L is a symmetric matrix since G is an undirected graph.
The evolution of the states of the multi-agent system is characterized through the scalar dynamicṡ
where x i (t) and u i (t) respectively denote the state and the local control input for agent i.
In this paper we design a piecewise-constant control input u i (t) for each agent i, as well as a protocol for the communication between the agents so that the agents achieve practical consensus, that is,
T representing the agent states converges in finite time to a vector x * ∈ R n belonging to the approximate consensus set D ε with ε > 0 given by
In what follows we first discuss the jamming attacks on the communication channels between the agents, and then we explain our proposed control and communication protocols for achieving consensus under jamming.
Jamming Attacks
We consider scenarios where the communication channels between the agents are disabled by a jamming attacker. Specifically, we assume that when there is a jamming attack, communication on all links E fail. This setup allows us to model attacks on a shared network that the agents use for communication. We note that the results presented in the paper can also be extended with small modifications to more general cases where the communication links are attacked individually by multiple attackers.
We follow the approach of De Persis and Tesi (2016), Senejohnny et al. (2015) , Senejohnny et al. (2017) and use the sequences {a k ≥ 0} k∈N0 and {τ k ≥ 0} k∈N0 to characterize the starting time instants and durations of the sequence of attacks, respectively. Specifically, a k represents the starting time instant for the kth attack, and τ k represents its duration. For each k ∈ N 0 , these scalars are assumed to satisfy a k+1 > a k + τ k (see the time sequence at the bottom of Figure 1 ).
the kth attack interval (or instant if τ k = 0), during which the attacker prevents all transmissions on the communication channels between the agents. For any time interval [τ, t] ⊂ [0, ∞), we use A(τ, t) to denote the set of times under jamming attacks, that is,
Furthermore, for the same interval [τ, t] , A c (τ, t) denotes the complement of A(τ, t) in the sense that it is the set of times where there is no attack, that is,
Conducting jamming attacks requires energy for transmitting interfering radio signals (Xu et al., 2005) . Thus, an attacker with limited resources would not be able to continuously jam the communication channels for a long time. In such cases, the attacker may repeat cycles of jamming and idling to preserve energy. The following assumption from Senejohnny et al. (2015) provides a characterization of the duration of jamming for various attack scenarios.
Assumption 2.1. There exist κ ≥ 0 and ρ ∈ (0, 1) such that for each τ ≥ 0 and t ≥ τ ,
where |A(τ, t)| represents the total duration of the attacks in the interval [τ, t] .
Notice that (5) implies lim sup t→∞ |A(0, t)|/t ≤ ρ. As a consequence, the scalar ρ ∈ (0, 1) can be considered as an upper-bound on the ratio of the duration of attacks in long intervals, and it is related to the average energy used by the attacker. Under Assumption 2.1, jamming attacks are allowed to start at arbitrary time instants as long as (5) holds. Note also that the longest duration for continuous jamming allowed under Assumption 2.1 can be obtained as κ/(1−ρ). Here, the scalar κ can be selected to model the attacker's capabilities for continuous jamming.
Stochastic Ternary Control
To achieve consensus we employ the ternary control approach previously used in De Persis and Frasca (2013), Senejohnny et al. (2015) , Senejohnny et al. (2017) . However, instead of the self-triggering method utilized in those studies, we propose a stochastic communication protocol. In what follows, we first explain the control framework. We then discuss our communication protocol in detail in Section 3.
Each agent i ∈ V attempts communicating with its neighbors N i at times t i k ≥ 0, k ∈ N 0 . In particular, at a communication attempt time t i k , agent i sends an information request to all of its neighbors and asks for their states. If there is no jamming at time t i k , then the neighbors of agent i receive the request and send back their states, which will be used in the update of agent i's local control input. In the case where there is a jamming attack at time t i k , agent i cannot send/receive information, and the control input is set to 0.
We use ϕ 
In this paper communication attempt times t i k are random variables, and consequently, ϕ i k are also random variables.
with ε > 0 given in (2). The local control input u i (t) for each agent i is given by u i (t) = 0 for t ∈ [0, t i 0 ) and
for k ∈ N 0 , where θ i k is given with
Observe that when there is no jamming at time t i k (i.e., if ϕ i k = 1), the control input for agent i takes values from {−1, 0, 1} depending on the states of agent i and its neighbors at that time. If agent i's state is sufficiently close to its neighbors' states so that On the other hand, if the ith agent successfully communicates with its neighbors at time t i k and learns that the neighbor states are sufficiently far from its state, then a nonzero control input value is selected. This nonzero value is fixed as the control input for the interval [t Example 2.2. In Figure 2 , we show an example trajectory for the control input u 2 (t) of agent 2. In this example, we have ϕ 
k is determined depending whether 
To achieve consensus under the control law (7), it is important to design the times t i k , k ∈ N 0 , i ∈ V, at which the agents attempt to communicate with each other. In this paper, we take a stochastic approach and design these times in Section 3 as random variables.
Remark 2.3. In Senejohnny et al. (2015) , the communication attempt times t i k , k ∈ N 0 , i ∈ V, are determined based on a deterministic self-triggering approach. There, the minimum interval between consecutive communication attempts for each agent is given by ∆ * > 0. It is observed in (Senejohnny et al., 2015) that if the attacker is allowed to attack at a frequency larger than the maximum frequency of communication attempts (given by 1 ∆ * ), then all communication may be blocked even if Assumption 2.1 is satisfied. This is because as t i k are deterministic times, an attacker that is knowledgeable on how t i k are decided may be able to generate a strategy to pinpoint t i k with attacks of very short durations and preserve energy for the rest of the time. To avoid this problem, Senejohnny et al. (2015) considers the additional assumption that there exist η ≥ 0 and σ < 1 ∆ * such that
for all τ ≥ 0 and t ≥ τ , where I(τ, t) ∈ N 0 denotes the number of attack intervals A n in the time frame [τ, t] . The scalar σ > 0 in (9) represents an upper-bound on the attack frequency in the long run. Note that since σ < 1 ∆ * , the assumption (9) guarantees that the attack frequency in large time frames is smaller than the frequency of communication attempts. By utilizing ρ from (5) and σ from (9), the main result in (Senejohnny et al., 2015) shows that consensus is achieved if
In the following section, we propose a stochastic communication protocol, where communication attempt times t i k , k ∈ N 0 , i ∈ V, are decided randomly. We show that in this case even if (9) and (10) are not satisfied due to high frequency attacks, consensus can still be achieved.
Stochastic Communication Protocol for Consensus
Under Jamming Attacks
Stochastic Communication Protocol
We propose a communication protocol where each agent attempts to communicate with its neighbors at random times that are unknown to the attacker until the agents attempt communication at those times.
Definition 3.1 (Stochastic communication protocol). For each agent i ∈ V, let ∆ i > 0 be a fixed scalar, and set t i k , k ∈ N 0 , to be independent random variables such that t
In this communication protocol, each agent i attempts to make transmission to its neighbors once in every
i , that is, the duration between consecutive communication attempts are ∆ i in expectation. We remark that the attacker is allowed to know how t i k is distributed, but not the value of t i k until the communication is attempted. In the example of Figure 1 with 3 agents, the attacker is able to block the first communication attempts of agents 1 and 3. However, the first attempt of agent 2 is successful. Thus, for this example, ϕ 
Finite-time Consensus Analysis
In the ternary control approach, the speed of change in each agent's state is at most 1. Therefore, agents need to apply the ternary control input to their dynamics for sufficiently long durations to get closer to their neighbors. Notice that the duration of control input application is affected by the number of successful communication attempts. In particular, it is likely that an agent i would apply control input to its dynamics for a longer duration, if that agent makes many successful communications with its neighbors.
For the consensus analysis, we want to establish a relation between two quantities: 1) the total duration each agent i applies a control input and 2) the total number of successful communications between agent i and its neighbors.
Consider the sum N k=0 ϕ i k θ i k , which corresponds to the total duration of control input application by agent i after the first N + 1 communication attempts. This duration is affected by not only the random times agent i attempts to communicate, but also the times and durations of the jamming attacks. Since the attack times and durations are uncertain, it is not possible to obtain exact statistics for the duration
However, interestingly, this duration possesses a lower-bound for sufficiently small values of T i . Specifically, the following result shows that it is lower-bounded by T i /2 multiplied by the total number of successful communications over the first N attempts. Its proof is presented in the appendix.
We are ready to present the first main result of this paper. The theorem below provides conditions under which the multiagent system (1), (7) (1), (7) with
Then x(t) converges in finite time to a vector x * ∈ R n belonging to the set D ε given by (2), almost surely.
Here, π i (t) corresponds to the last communication attempt time before time t. Now let T max i∈V ∆ i and let
Observe that W(t) corresponds to the set of agents that have a nonzero control input u i (t) at time t.
for t ≥ T , where
Our next goal is to show ave
To this end, we need to show that
Since t < µ i (t) for i ∈ W(t), we have 2d
Similarly, we can show that if
Noting that |ave i (π i (t))| ≥ ε for i ∈ W(t), we obtain from (16) and (17) 
Since
where α min i∈V (ε − 2d i T i ) and
By integrating both sides of (18),
The ternary control (7) satisfies |u i (t)| ≤ 1, and as a result, u T (t)u(t) ≤ n. Noting that the symmetric matrix L possesses a symmetric square root L 1 2 , we ob-
Now, since V (x(T )) ≤ v and V (x(t)) ≥ 0, it follows from (19) that for all t ≥ T , t T i∈V
We define f
Furthermore, by noting that 1 t
Now, let C > 0 andM 2(
As a consequence, for every h > 0,
almost surely. It follows from (22)- (24) that for every h > 0,
almost surely. Next, let
As a consequence of (25), we have P[β i < ∞] = 1, i ∈ V. Therefore, by (21),
, implying x(t) converges to a vector in D ε in finite time, almost surely.
Condition (12) in Theorem 3.3 is concerned with the number of successful communication attempts. In particular, (12) guarantees that each agent can achieve infinitely many successful communications in the long run. In Section 4, we will show that (12) holds and consensus can be achieved under different attack strategies that satisfy Assumption 2.1 on the average duration of jamming.
For the proof of Theorem 3.3, we utilize the function (1/2)x T (t)Lx(t) and explore its evolution. This approach is also utilized by De Persis and Frasca (2013), Senejohnny et al. (2015) , and Senejohnny et al. (2017) . However, there are some key differences. An important role is played by Lemma 3.2 for showing that infinite number of successful inter-agent communications implies almost-sure finite-time consensus. Notice also that the analysis is facilitated by the choice of parameters T i ∈ (0, min{
2 allows us to relate the total nonzero control duration with the total number of successful communications of agent i through Lemma 3.2. Furthermore, T i < ε 2d i ensures a certain decay for the Lyapunov-like function (1/2)x T (t)Lx(t) after a successful communication by agent i.
Deterministic Jamming and Communication-Aware Jamming
In this section, we consider two different attack strategies that a jamming attacker may follow. We show that consensus can be achieved in both cases.
Consensus Under Deterministic Attacks
First, we consider the attack strategy where the starting time and the duration of the jamming attacks do not depend on the time instants at which the agents try to communicate. In particular, concerning the sequences {a k } k∈N0 and {τ k } k∈N0 , we assume the following. 
Assumption 4.1 is useful to model scenarios where the attacker cannot detect the transmissions on the communication channels. Note that the attacker may still be knowledgeable on certain properties of the multi-agent system such as the number of agents, communication topology, as well as the scalars ∆ i , i ∈ V, used in the communication protocol.
Our analysis relies on a few key definitions. First, let
Now define∆
With these definitions,∆ i is an integer multiple of ∆ i that is selected to be larger than κ/(1−ρ). In the interval [k∆ i , (k+ 1)∆ i ), agent i makes γ i number of communication attempts with its neighbors, and moreover,φ i k takes the value 0 if all of these attempts fail and 1 if one or more of these attempts are successful. We emphasize that γ i ,∆ i , andφ We now show that under Assumptions 2.1 and 4.1, agents can successfully communicate with their neighbors infinitely many times in the long run, almost surely. Proof. It follows from (29) that for every i ∈ V,
In what follows, we show (12) by proving that 
By Assumption 2.1 and∆ i > κ/(1 − ρ), we obtain
As a consequence,
. . are independent and the sequences {a k } k∈N0 and {τ k } k∈N0 are deterministic (by Assumption 4.1), the events B Karr (1993) ) that P[E] = 1. Consequently, noting that {ω ∈ Ω :
. Hence, (31) holds. Finally, (12) follows from (30) and (31). Proposition 4.2 implies that agents can achieve infinitely many successful communications with their neighbors in the long run under any deterministic attack strategy satisfying (5) in Assumption 2.1.
The proof of Proposition 4.2 relies on a few essential principles. First of all, we do not directly compute the successful communications in each ∆ i -length interval. Instead, we look at the longer∆ i -length intervals and compute how many of these intervals include successful communications. This is useful due to the fact that∆ i is chosen for the analysis to be larger than the longest possible duration κ/(1 − ρ) of a continuous jamming attack. Regardless of how large κ ≥ 0 and ρ ∈ (0, 1) can be, there always exists such a∆ i as given in (28). We remark again that since∆ i is needed only for the analysis, its value is not necessary for the multi-agent operation.
In the proof of Proposition 4.2, we also take advantage of the uniform distribution of the communication attempt times in each ∆ i -length interval. The probability of at least one successful communication in a∆ i -length interval [k∆ i , (k + 1)∆ i ) is lower-bounded by the probability of an event that we construct in the proof. This is the event that one of communication attempt times that is selected uniformly randomly from the γ i number of attempt times in the interval [k∆ i , (k + 1)∆ i ) does not face a jamming attack. The uniform distribution property of the attempt times over the ∆ i -length intervals and thus the∆ i -length intervals allows derivation of the probability bound.
The proof of Proposition 4.2 also relies on the fact that the attacks are deterministic, and hence the attack times do not depend on the communication attempt times.
Next, by using Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 3.3, we show that under deterministic attacks, the multi-agent system (1), (7) achieves consensus in finite time, almost surely. (1), (7) with We emphasize again that the result does not depend on the frequency of attacks. In particular, the proposed stochastic communication protocol allows us to deal with attack scenarios where the jamming is turned on and off very frequently.
Consensus Under Communication-Aware Attacks
We now explore an attack strategy where the attacker can sense communication attempts on the channel and turns the jamming on and off based on the activity of the agents. Here, we consider a simpler setup where the ∆ i = ∆, i ∈ V, with ∆ > 0. In this setup, kth communication attempt time of each agent is in the interval [k∆, (k + 1)∆), i.e., t
We consider an attack strategy where the attacker knows about the communication protocol as well as ∆. The attacker generates an attack so that for each interval [k∆, (k + 1)∆), i) the jamming attack starts from t = k∆, ii) the jamming attack continues until timet k as long as Assumption 2.1 is satisfied.
Under this strategy, for the interval [k∆, (k + 1)∆), the attacker turns off jamming right after all communication attempts are blocked. This allows the attacker to preserve energy to be used later. Furthermore, the attacker can block transmissions among the agents in a more thorough way than the deterministic strategy. Clearly, if the attacker wants to interfere at the randomly chosen communication attempt times for sure, he has to keep jamming untilt k in each interval [k∆, (k + 1)∆).
To characterize a k , τ k , k ∈ N 0 , for this strategy, first let
for k ∈ N 0 . Note that s k ∈ [0, ∆] denotes the largest duration that a jamming attack starting at k∆ can last without violating the condition (5) in Assumption 2.1. Now, let
Observe that s k gives the duration of the attack in the interval [k∆, (k + 1)∆) for this strategy. In particular, the jamming attack is turned on for t ∈ [k∆, k∆ + s k ], and turned off for t ∈ (k∆ + s k , (k + 1)∆). Hence, a k , τ k can be given by
Consequently, the set of time instants where communication is not possible in the interval [k∆, (k + 1)∆) is then given by the set
We remark that the communication-aware jamming described by (32) satisfies (5) in Assumption 2.1 by construction.
To illustrate the properties of the communication-aware attack strategy, we show an example attack scenario in Figure 3 . Here, the attacker is able to block all communications that are attempted in the interval [0, ∆) by jamming the network between times 0 andt 0 = max i∈V t i 0 . After blocking, the attacker turns off jamming and waits until the next interval [∆, 2∆). In the interval [∆, 2∆), the duration of the attack is relatively large, because agent 2 attempts communication towards the end of the interval. The attacker has to use large energy resources for this interval. As a result, the attacker cannot conduct an attack with very long duration in the interval [2∆, 3∆), since Assumption 2.1 holds only for a short duration of length τ 2 . And after that, the attacker has to turn off jamming to save resources. Therefore, in the interval [2∆, 3∆), it happens that agent 1 can successfully communicate after the jamming is turned off. As a result, we have ϕ We show in the following that the agents achieve consensus under the communication-aware attack strategy given in (32) by using our proposed stochastic communication protocol. (27)- (29) with ∆ i = ∆. Note that in this subsection, we have γ i = γ j ,∆ i =∆ j for all i, j ∈ V, since all agents attempt communication at the same time. We can thus simplify the notation by setting
The analysis of consensus under communication-aware jamming attacks is quite different from the case with deterministic jamming attacks. Here, we utilize a filtration representing the timing of the attacks and communication attempt instants. In particular, we consider the filtration {H 
{∅, Ω}.
In what follows our main objective is to show that the agents can communicate with their neighbors infinitely many times in the long run satisfying (12), even though the network faces communication-aware jamming attacks described in (32). We show this by establishing several key results. First, we investigate the probability of successful communications in the intervals [k∆, (k + 1)∆), k ∈ N 0 . The following result provides a positive lower-bound for the conditional probability of a successful communication in [k∆, (k+1)∆) given H i k−1 (i.e., the information on all previous intervals).
Lemma 4.4. Consider the stochastic communication protocol in Definition 3.1. For the attacks given by (32), we have
where
Proof. In the interval [k∆ i , (k +1)∆) = [kγ∆, (k +1)γ∆), agent i attempts communication with its neighbors for γ number of times at time instants t (29) and (33) that
where the right-hand side represents the conditional probability of a successful communication at time t i (k+1)γ−1 . Hence, to prove (34) it suffices to show
To show (37), we first consider the case γ = 1. In this case, ∆ = ∆ and |A(k∆, (k + 1)∆)| = τ k < ∆, almost surely. Moreover, we have
Now, since
By using (38) and (39), we obtain
which shows that (37) holds when γ = 1. Now, consider the case γ ≥ 2. By noting ∆ < ∆, we let
Observe that F k ∈ F denotes the event that the random communication attempt time t Let the events G k ∈ F , k ∈ N 0 , be given by
It follows that
In the remainder of the proof, we will show
and
We will then use (43)- (45) to show (37).
To establish (44), we first simplify the presentation and define the time instants b k kγ∆, c k (k + 1)γ∆ − ∆, and
gives the union of the first γ − 1 number of ∆-length intervals in [k∆, (k + 1)∆), and moreover, [c k , d k ) gives the last ∆-length interval. Hence,
By noting that
It then follows from Assumption 2.1 that
Noting that 2 ∆ < ∆, we use (47) to show that the events
As a consequence of (46) and (48), we obtain
Here, we have
This is because, for every outcome ω * ∈ G k , the first γ − 1 communication attempts of agent i happen in the last ∆ units of time in their respective intervals, and thus by (32), the total duration of the attacks in the interval b k , c k is at
Next, we show (45). First of all, we note that G k is independent of H i k−1 . Therefore,
To compute
are independent, and thus, the events F kγ , F kγ+1 , · · · , F (k+1)γ−2 are also independent. As a result,
Hence, (45) follows from (50) and (51). Finally, we use (43)- (45) to obtain (37), leading us to (34).
In (34), the conditional probability term P[φ
Furthermore, its expectation gives the probability of havingφ k = 1, i.e.,
In other words, for each interval [k∆, (k + 1)∆), our stochastic communication protocol guarantees a positive probability for a successful communication.
In the proof of Lemma 4.4, we consider the interval [k∆ i , (k + 1)∆) that is composed of γ number of ∆-length intervals. In each of these ∆-length intervals, agent i attempts to communicate once. In our approach, we find a lower bound for P[φ
(the conditional probability that at least 1 out of γ communication attempts is successful). This is done by computing a lower bound for
, which is the conditional probability that the last attempt is successful. The key method in deriving this bound is the construction of the event G k given in (42). Here, G k is the event that the first γ − 1 number of communication attempts of agent i happen in the last ∆ units of time in their respective ∆-length intervals. If G k happens, then it means that the attacker needs to use sufficiently large jamming resources to block those first γ − 1 attempts. As a result, the attacker would not have enough resources left to guarantee blocking the last attempt. This allows us to compute a lower bound of P[{ϕ
We then use the inequality P[ϕ
] to arrive at the result (34). This result is crucial in proving the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5. Consider the attack strategy described by (32) . Under the stochastic communication protocol in Definition 3.1, we have
for ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , . . . , ϕ N ∈ {0, 1} and N ∈ N.
Proof. We show (52) by induction. First, we consider the case where N = 1. In this case, we obtain
By Lemma 4.4, we have P[
Thus, we have (52) for N = 1.
Next, assume (52) holds for N =Ñ > 2, that is
We will show that (52) holds for N =Ñ + 1. Observe
Since the random variablesφ
-measurable, from (55), we obtain
By Lemma 4.4, we have P[φ iÑ = 0|H
It then follows from (56) and (57) that
Finally, by using (54) and (58), we obtain (52) with N = N + 1, which completes the proof.
Lemma 4.5 provides an upper bound for the probability of the event that the random variablesφ i 0 ,φ i 1 , . . . ,φ i N −1 take the particular values ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , . . . , ϕ N ∈ {0, 1}, respectively. This result is important because the upper-bound can be given in terms of the scalar q, which depends on ρ and κ characterizing the attacker's capabilities as well as the parameter ∆ of the communication protocol. Notice that if the sequence ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , . . . , ϕ N is formed of m number of 1s and N − m number of 0s, then the probability bound in (52) is given by (1−2q γ ) N −m . The following result is built upon this observation.
Proposition 4.6. Consider the attack strategy described by (32) . Under the stochastic communication protocol in Definition 3.1, we have
for all M ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N } and N ∈ N.
Proof. First, we obtain
Now, let
By using Lemma 4.5 we obtain from (61) that
Note that
Finally, by using (60) and (63), we arrive at (59).
Proposition 4.6 provides a lower bound of the probability that agent i can communicate with its neighbors at least M times during the interval [0, N∆). Notice that as N approaches ∞, this lower bound approaches 1. Proof. Our initial goal is to show To this end, first let A N {ω ∈ Ω :
Since 1−2q γ < 1, it follows from (65) that lim N →∞ P[A N ] = 1. The events A N , N ∈ N, satisfy A N ⊆ A N +1 . Hence, by the monotone-convergence theorem for sets (see Section 1.10 in Williams (1991) ),
follows from (66) that (12) holds.
Theorem 4.7 shows that the agents can communicate with their neighbors infinitely many times in the long run, even though the network is attacked by an attacker that follows the communication-aware attack strategy described in (32). The next theorem is the main result for the multi-agent system under communication-aware attacks. Proof. By Theorem 4.7, we have (12). Consequently, the result follows from Theorem 3.3.
So far we considered the consensus problem under both deterministic attacks and communication-aware attacks. In both cases, the randomness in the communication attempt times is the key property that enables consensus regardless of the frequency of jamming. A difference is that the attacker following the communication-aware attack strategy can sense the network activity and switch off the jamming attack right after blocking a communication attempt. This allows the attacker to preserve energy. This is further illustrated through numerical examples in the next section.
Numerical Examples
In this section, we illustrate our results for the multi-agent system with n = 6 agents whose topology is shown in Figure 4 . 
Deterministic Attacks
We first consider a deterministic attack scenario where the strategy of the attacker satisfies Assumptions 2.1 and 4.1 with κ = 0.2, ρ = 0.8. We utilize our proposed stochastic communication protocol with ∆ i = 0.001 + 0.0001(i + 1), i ∈ V. For the control laws (7), we choose
2 }) with ε = 0.02. Since Proposition 4.2 implies (12), it follows from Theorem 3.3 that the multi-agent system achieves consensus.
In the top part of Figure 5 , we show sample paths of agent states under jamming attacks with low frequency. We see that consensus is achieved around the time t = 8.2. Each agent i attempts to communicate once at a random time instant at every ∆ i units of time. The agents keep their states constant during long jamming intervals.
The attack depicted in the top part of Figure 5 is of low frequency, as the jamming is turned on and off only 14 times during the interval [0, 10] . We also consider a high frequency case in the bottom plot of Figure 5 , where jamming is turned on and off 15908 times during the interval [0, 10], but the agent communication attempt times are the same as those in the top plot. Also in this case, the agents reach the consensus set D ε around the time t = 8.1. Both the low and the high frequency attacks in Figure 5 are generated randomly and independently of the communication attempt times of the agents. Through repeated simulations, we also observe that consensus is reached around the same time.
Next, we consider periodically generated jamming attacks with
where σ > 0 denotes the frequency of attacks (i.e., the number of attack intervals in 1 unit of time). Moreover, Table 1 Mean mC and standard deviation sC of consensus times for different values of ρ and σ in deterministic attacks (67). ρ > 0 indicates the ratio of the duration of attacks in each period. For each ρ ∈ {0.2, 0.5, 0.8} and σ ∈ {10 1 , 10 3 , 10 5 } we repeat the simulation 50 times. For each simulation j ∈ {1, . . . , 50}, we calculate t C (j)
inf{t : x i (t) ∈ D ε , i ∈ V}, which is the time agents reach consensus. Then we obtain their mean m C > 0 and standard deviation s C > 0. Table 1 indicates that increasing the ratio ρ of the attack duration allows the attacker to delay the consensus. On the other hand, consensus time is not influenced by how frequent the attacks are. For each value of ρ, mean consensus time m C is about the same value under all attack frequency settings σ = 10 1 , 10 3 , 10 5 . Furthermore, consensus times are finite in all simulations and they do not show much deviation (i.e., s C is small) in all cases. The cases with ρ = 0.8 indicate that periodic attacks and the attack timings shown in Figure 5 do not differ much in their effects on consensus times.
Communication-Aware Attacks
Next, we consider the scenario where the attacker follows the communication-aware attack strategy of (32) with the same parameters κ = 0.2 and ρ = 0.8 as in Section 5.1.
In this scenario, the intervals for the communication are selected as ∆ i = ∆ = 0.001, i ∈ V. Similar to the deterministic case discussed above, for the control law (7), we choose T i = ∆/2.1, i ∈ V, which satisfy T i ∈ (0, min{
2 }) with ε = 0.02. Furthermore, Theorem 4.7 implies that (12) holds. Therefore, it follows from Theorem 3.3 that the multiagent system with the stochastic communication protocol achieves consensus.
We show the evolution of the agent states in Figure 6 . Notice that every communication attempt in the interval [0, 3.18] is blocked by the attacker. However, the attacker's energy resources eventually become not sufficient. We observe in the enlarged plot in the bottom part of Figure 6 that some of the communication attempts cannot be blocked by the attacker and the agents eventually achieve consensus.
Even though the value of ρ is the same with ρ = 0.8 as in deterministic attacks case of the previous example, the communication-aware attacks can be more malicious in the sense that they can delay consensus (compare Figures 5 and  6 ). To further investigate how ρ and κ affect the consensus time, we run simulations with different values of ρ and κ but with the same communication attempt times used for constructing Figure 6 . We observe in Figure7 that consensus time t C increases as ρ increases. The scalar κ ≥ 0 also has an effect on the consensus time. In particular, increasing κ delays the consensus, since the duration for continuous jamming becomes larger.
We remark that in communication-aware attacks, the attacker turns jamming on and off once in every ∆-length intervals. Hence, the frequency of attacks is equal to the frequency of communication attempts. This case is outside the class of attacks considered previously in Senejohnny et al. (2015) . On the other hand, the class of attacks under which our communication protocol allows consensus is not restricted by the frequency of attacks. Specifically, as long as the the average ratio of the duration of attacks in the long run is bounded by ρ < 1, consensus can be achieved.
Conclusion
We proposed a stochastic communication protocol for multiagent consensus under jamming attacks. In this protocol, agents attempt to exchange information with their neighbors at uniformly distributed random time instants. We showed that our proposed communication protocol guarantees consensus as long as the jamming attacks satisfy a certain condition on the average ratio of their duration. We demonstrated our results both for a deterministic attack strategy and a communication-aware attack strategy.
The analysis in this paper enables a natural extension to the case with multiple jamming attackers that can attack different links at different times. In such a problem setting, if the deterministic or the communication-aware attack for each communication link satisfies Assumption 2.1, then two agents can communicate over that link infinitely many times in the long run. This allows agents to achieve consensus through a modified control law where each agent can communicate with different neighbors at different times.
